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Abstract 
We examine the conditions that lead to Stroop interference for a meaningless 
linguistic label. Tiffany’s (1990) model of drug abuse implies that individuals will 
respond more slowly to drug-related words compared to neutral words in an 
emotional Stroop task, because the former have many automatic associations (e.g., 
positive expectancies). To examine this proposal, we trained participants to associate 
a meaningless label with either one other word or several other words and examined 
the induced Stroop interference for these meaningless labels. In two experiments, and 
contrary to expectations from Tiffany’s work, we observed greatest Stroop 
interference for the meaningless label with just one association. These results are 
discussed in terms of associative learning theory.  
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Introduction  
The classic Stroop task is one of the most studied paradigms in psychology, with over 
2,500 studies since the seminal work of J.R.Stoop (1935). There have been several 
proposals to explain the classic Stroop effect, such as the speed of processing of 
linguistic information relative to perceptual information (Schooler et al., 1997), the 
automaticity of processing linguistic information (Logan, 1980; MacLeod & Dunbar, 
1988; cf. Meiran et al., 2002; Tzelgov, Porat, Henik, 1997), and connectionist 
modeling (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990). A central component in these 
accounts is a conflict between the information derived from the linguistic component 
of a stimulus and its perceptual component (for an overview, see MacLeod, 1991). 
Such a conflict cannot explain results in the emotional Stroop task, which is the focus 
of the present work.  
 In the emotional Stroop task, participants receive colored words, such that the 
meaning of the words has some emotional salience for the participants. For example, 
alcohol abusers will see words related to alcohol (as well as neutral words), anxious 
participants will see words related to their anxiety, etc. Interference in such versions 
of the Stroop task has been widely documented. For example, alcohol abusers will 
take longer to name the color of alcohol-related words, compared to neutral words 
(Bauer & Cox, 1998; Bruce & Jones, 2004; Cox, Blount, & Rozak, 2000), smokers 
will likewise be distracted by smoking-related words (Hogarth et al., 2003; Hogarth, 
Dickinson, & Duka, 2003; Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Waters & Feyerabend, 2000), and 
individuals restricting their food intake by food-related stimuli (Tapper et al., 2008). 
A key point is that a theoretical explanation for the (various version of the) emotional 
Stroop task has to be different from an explanation for the classic Stroop task (Algom, 
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Chajut, & Lev, 2004; Cox, Fadardi, & Pothos, 2006; Williams, Mathews, & 
MacLeod, 1996). This is because in the emotional Stroop task there is no conflict 
between the perceptual properties of the words and their meaning, as in the classic 
Stroop. Rather, participants in emotional Stroop tasks get distracted by the meaning 
of the words, and have to delay processing the color of the words that is required to 
complete the task. The emotional Stroop effect has resisted a compelling theoretical 
explanation.  
 We briefly consider four explanations for the emotional Stroop, from 
Robinson and Berridge (1993), Waters and Green (2003), Cox and Klinger (1990), 
and Tiffany (1990). The last approach is purely cognitive, in that it postulates that the 
emotional Stroop effect arises from elementary associative learning processes 
between elements. Such elements do not have to be emotionally salient, so that the 
intriguing possibility arises that Stroop effects can be observed by associating neutral 
elements. Our purpose is to examine this theory in an experimental context with 
neutral stimuli, so avoiding complications from variables which are hard to measure 
(such as emotional salience). In other words, we are asking whether we can 
understand the emotional Stroop without reference to emotional salience. This 
exercise will also help relate associative learning theory with theories of substance 
abuse based on learned associations.  
Incentive salience theory postulates that certain substances eventually become 
more desired, even if they are not necessarily liked (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). The 
brain becomes sensitized to information about the substance, so that such information 
becomes more attention ‘grabbing’. Accordingly, when alcohol abusers see an 
alcohol-related word in an alcohol version of the Stroop task, they will preferentially 
process the meaning of the word at the expense of the perceptual properties of the 
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word. It is less clear, however, whether incentive salience theory can predict attention 
disengagement from word meaning, which would be needed to explain emotional 
Stroop results.  
Waters and Green (2003) suggested that for alcohol abusers, the presence of 
alcohol-related stimuli elicits anxiety and so leads to a reduction in the efficiency of 
attentional processes. Hence, alcohol abusers are less able than light drinkers to ignore 
alcohol words in an alcohol Stroop task. Such an explanation cannot be a general one. 
For example, there are cases when attentional processes related to personally relevant 
stimuli are more efficient than for neutral stimuli. Using the dot probe task, Pothos et 
al. (2008) found that external eaters attended more rapidly to food-related cues 
compared to neutral ones (so that the relevant attentional process would be more 
efficient).   
 In the motivational approach to (e.g.) excessive drinking, Cox and Klinger 
(1990, 2004) suggested that our lives are organized around the pursuit of goals, each 
one of which corresponds to a current concern. A current concern will cause the 
person to direct attention towards and process more extensively cues in the 
environment relevant to the goal. Thus, an alcohol abuser performing the alcohol 
version of the Stroop task would be more distracted by alcohol-related stimuli, 
compared to neutral ones, leading to an attentional bias for such stimuli. An 
unexplained issue is the persistence of current concerns related to substance abuse: 
An alcohol abuser cannot just stop having a current concern for alcohol. This 
persistence suggests automatic processes (cf. Logan, 1988; Tzelgov, 1997), an 
observation which leads us to Tiffany’s (1990) theory for substance abuse.  
 According to Tiffany (1990), the frequency of substance abuse results in the 
development of automatic associations between the substance and positive 
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corresponding expectancies, elements of a person’s routine that are related to the 
substance, related concerns etc. (Cox et al., 2006; McKenna & Sharma, 1995; Peretti, 
1998; Stetter et al., 1995). Regarding the emotional Stroop, when (e.g.) an alcohol 
abuser encounters an alcohol-related stimulus, these automatic associations result in 
the activation of other information, leading to a temporary bottleneck in cognitive 
processing (cf. Collins & Loftus, 1975). Consistent with this view, Rather et al. 
(1992) reported that in a ‘map’ of the relations between alcohol-related concepts and 
other information for heavy and light drinkers, conceptual organization was more 
centered around the alcohol concepts for heavy drinkers compared to light drinkers 
(cf. Stacy, 1997).  
 Tiffany’s (1990) proposal does not involve information about emotional 
salience, and so it can be examined with emotionally neutral stimuli. We trained 
participants to associate one meaningless word (‘blib’) with one real word and another 
meaningless word ( ‘flet’) with seven, related real words. The associations were 
trained over five consecutive days and learning was supported by explicit instruction 
(Hogarth & Duka, 2006). Subsequently, we examined the Stroop interference for the 
meaningless words. Which meaningless word led to the greatest Stroop interference, 
the one with a single association or the one with many associations? The latter result 
would support Tiffany’s proposal, but the opposite result was observed. 
We can consider Tiffany’s theory and our proposed manipulation under the 
light of standard associative learning theory. According to one tradition, a stronger 
cue/target association should increase attention to the cue (Mackintosh, 1975; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Kruschke et al. (2005) implemented this idea in a 
connectionist model, in which the attentional salience of more reliable predictors was 
increased. Such a model accounted well for, e.g., the effects of blocking and 
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highlighting. According to another tradition, more attention should be allocated to 
stimuli which have been involved in prediction errors (the idea being that a limited 
capacity agent has less to gain by attending to reliable predictors; Pearce and Hall, 
1980). Consistent with this perspective, Wills, Croft, and Hodgson (2007) found a 
reduction in the amount of attention for reliable predictors using an EEG methodology 
and eye-tracking. Likewise, Hogarth et al. (2008a) found that unreliable predictors 
attracted more attention compared to predictors which reliably predicted either an 
outcome or its absence. With respect to the proposed manipulation, the association 
between a meaningless word and a single real word would be stronger so that, 
according to Mackintosh (1975) this meaningless word should lead to higher Stroop 
latencies. By contrast, according to Pearce and Hall (1980), in the case of the 
association between a meaningless word and several real words, the meaningless 
word would be a less reliable predictor of any particular real word; so, it is this 
meaningless word which should lead higher Stroop latencies.  
The view that strength of association may direct attention in a Stroop task can 
be indirectly supported by the results of Tzelgov, Henik, and Leiser (1990). They 
examined Hebrew-Arabic bilinguals with a Stroop task, to find Stroop interference for 
both the native and the second language. The Stroop effect was larger in the native 
language, for which, presumably, associations between word forms and meanings 
were stronger (other research has also reported larger Stroop effects for participants’ 
native language).  
 The emotional Stroop task has been the focus of extensive theorizing. In 
closing the introduction, we can consider why this has been the case. The emotional 
Stroop has had predictive value across a range of psychopathologies. Cox et al. (2002) 
showed that alcoholics in a treatment centre who showed an increased alcohol Stroop 
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bias during their treatment were more likely to relapse three months later. Cox, 
Pothos, and Hosier (2007) found that alcohol Stroop bias predicted a reduction in the 
number of drinking days of excessive drinkers. Mogg et al. (1995) examined patients 
suffering from anxiety problems. Successful treatment led to the elimination of 
anxiety-related attentional biases. Understanding what aspect of cue reactivity the 
emotional Stroop measures will help explain these clinical findings and, possibly, lead 
to the development of cognitive-style interventions (Wiers et al., 2006). However, not 
all research supports the view of a causal link between substance abuse and 
corresponding attentional biases. For example, Hogarth et al. (2008a) reported drug 
seeking behavior even when a corresponding attentional bias had been abolished.  
 
Experimental investigation 
The experimental test of the above ideas involves two challenges. First, the training 
routine has to be extensive enough to warrant some semblance of Tiffany’s (1990) 
postulated automatic associations. Note that the issue is not whether the associations 
are learned or not (they are very simple and they would be learned reasonably rapidly) 
but, rather, whether the associations are learned to a degree to which they can be 
considered automatic (and so lead to Stroop interference). The second challenge 
corresponds to how learning in the case of the single associate can be counterbalanced 
with learning in the case of multiple associates. Clearly, there are many ways to 
achieve such counterbalancing. Our approach in this work has been to consider two 
kinds of counterbalancing (examined in separate, between-participants conditions) 
and assess directly whether the form of counterbalancing makes a difference in our 
results or not (results show it does not).  
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Participants  
Participants were 129 Swansea University undergraduate students, who took part for 
either course credit or a payment of £20. They were trained on five consecutive days 
(in nearly all cases Monday to Friday). The Stroop test was always on the last day. 
Sixty-nine participants were allocated to Condition 1 and 60 to Condition 2.   
 
Materials and procedure 
For both conditions, participants were taught to associate a meaningless label with 
one single (real) word or with seven related (real) words. In one version of the tasks, 
‘blib’ was associated with ‘paper’ and ‘flet’ with ‘pliers, nails, spanner, rake, spade, 
hosepipe, and drill’ and in a second version ‘blib’ was associated with ‘paper, eraser, 
labels, desk, fax, Sellotape, and envelope’ and ‘flet’ with ‘pliers’. In both cases, the 
seven words were broadly related to each other, so as to capture the intuition that 
automatic links postulated by Tiffany (1990) presumably involve related concepts. 
(For example, for an alcohol abuser, there would be many automatic links between 
alcohol and concepts broadly related to alcohol and so to each other.) It is important 
to check that the ‘one’ and ‘many’ words associated with the meaningless labels are 
roughly equally emotionally salient, since any such difference could potentially lead 
to a difference in Stroop results. In pilot studies, we checked that the words in one 
category had roughly equal and neutral valence to the words in the other category. We 
do not describe these results in detail, since we also collected emotional valence data 
for each word from each participant individually; these results will be incorporated in 
the analyses.  
 To simplify the description of our research, henceforth One label refers to the 
meaningless label associated with one word, Many label refers to the meaningless 
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label associated with many words, One word refers to the one word associated with a 
meaningless label, and Many words the many words associated with the other 
meaningless label.  
 The learning task involved five learning sessions on consecutive days. Each 
learning session involved a block of 96 trials, which were presented in a new, 
randomized order for each participant. Each learning trial in the task begun with a 
fixation cross for 350 ms, followed by a screen where a word or a meaningless label 
was presented on the left, an arrow was shown in the middle, and another word was 
presented on the right; for example, ‘Rake -------> Blib’. In the bottom right corner of 
the screen, the question ‘Go together or not?’ appeared, prompting participants to 
respond yes, if the association was an intended one, or no if it was not. The feedback 
was in the form of the words ‘Correct!’ or ‘Incorrect!’, shown in the middle of the 
screen for 700 ms., after which the next trial appeared. Whether a meaningless label 
appeared on the left or the right of the computer screen was counterbalanced (e.g.,, 
participants would both see a trial in which they would be asked about the association 
Blib ----> Paper and the trial Paper ----> Blib). Both participant responses and 
reaction times were recorded.  
 Condition 1 and Condition 2 differed in terms of how the counterbalancing for 
the One and Many associations was carried out. In Condition 1 there were the same 
number of trials with the One label as with the Many label, but, clearly there were 
many more trials with the One label in which the correct answer was ‘not goes with’ 
compared to the Many label. Condition 1 is explained in Table 1. In Condition 2 in 
each training session we showed only one occurrence of each possible negative trial 
(in which the answer was no), so that this condition predominantly involved positive 
trials (in which the correct answer was ‘yes’). Inevitably, in Condition 2 there were 
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many more Many trials than One trials (Table 2). Thus, both conditions were 
designed to teach a certain association to participants, but emphasized different 
aspects of the learning problem.  
---------------------------------TABLE 1, 2------------------------------ 
After the first learning session, participants received a sheet of paper with the 
correct associations between the meaningless labels and the words. Note that Hogarth 
et al. (2008a; cf. Hogarth & Duka, 2006) reported that attentional biases for a target 
associated with a cue developed only for participants who were aware of the cue-
target association. The instructions participants received for the learning task were as 
basic as possible. Participants were simply told that in each trial they would see a 
word on the left-hand side of the screen, and another on the right-hand side and that 
they would have to have to decide whether the two words  ‘go together’ or not (by 
pressing the appropriate key). They were told that initially they would not know 
which words went with which, but that they would eventually learn through corrective 
feedback. No information was given about the Stroop task, which was going to follow 
the training sessions.  
 After the last training session on the fifth day, participants were told that they 
would see various words in different colors on the computer screen and that they must 
identify the color of the words as quickly and as accurately as possible. We used four 
colors, red, green, yellow, and blue; the four colors were employed approximately 
equally often. Participants first went through eight practice trials, in which they had to 
identify the print color of different color words (e.g., the word ‘green’ printed in blue 
etc.). Participants were told whether their response was correct or wrong after each 
practice trial. Following the practice trials, participants were asked whether they had 
any questions and, if not, they went through a Stroop task where the stimuli were the 
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two meaningless labels and all the words that were associated with them. The stimuli 
were presented in a new, randomized order for each participant. No feedback was 
provided in these trials. Thus, the Stroop task consisted of 20 trials (two meaningless 
labels, plus the 8 real words associated with them, presented twice). For both the 
practice and the subsequent Stroop trials, each trial begun with a fixation cross which 
was replaced after 350 ms with the word that had to be responded to. The word was 
visible on the computer screen until a response was made. Reaction times were 
recorded with the response box provided by Cedrus corp. for Superlab, for better 
accuracy.  
 Finally, after the Stroop task, participants received a valence questionnaire, in 
which they had to rate various feelings for each of the words used in the associations. 
Specifically, participants were asked to rate on a Likert 1-7 scale, how much elation, 
happiness, pleasure, fear, sadness, and disgust they felt for each one of the words used 
in the learning task. In this way, we could control for any individual variation in the 
emotional valence of the words.  
 
Results 
All tests below have been run on reaction times for trials for which correct responses 
were provided and trials for which reaction times were not more than 6000 ms; 
responses which took more than 6000 ms were considered spurious. Regarding 
Condition 1, in the learning task, in Session 1, for some participants there were as 
many as 30% of trials for which reaction time was more than 6000 ms, but by Session 
5 there were only a handful of trials which were eliminated. Regarding Condition 2, 
outliers were less than 5% for all participants for all sessions (training sessions or 
Stroop task sessions). Figure 1 shows the acquisition curves for the two conditions. 
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Predictably, the differences in the learning regime led to corresponding differences in 
the learning of the associations. Our objective is not to examine such differences in 
detail, apart from when they might impact on the corresponding Stroop task results. 
Note that we call a Stroop effect or Stroop interference the finding that ink-naming for 
one label takes longer than ink naming for the other label (by analogy with the fact 
that emotional Stroop interference refers to the longer ink-naming times for, e.g., 
alcohol-related words compared to neutral words).   
---------------------------------------FIGURE 1----------------------------------------------- 
 Our experimental hypothesis relates to Stroop interference for the One or 
Many label, assuming that the associations with the real words have been highly 
learned. Accordingly, we added the error rate at training session 5 for both the One 
and the Many associations. This aggregate error rate ranged from 0% to 97.91%. We 
decided to eliminate all 13 (out of 129) participants with an aggregate error rate of 
10% or more. Additionally, for another 14 participants there were irregularities in 
testing (e.g., noise from building work, mobile phone ringing, talking). These 
participants were also eliminated. All subsequent analyses were carried out on this 
reduced sample of 102 participants.  
 The main dependent variables were the Stroop interference for the One label 
and the Stroop interference for the Many label (that is, the color-naming response 
latency for the One/ Many label). We first examined whether there was a main effect 
of condition, by using between participants t-tests to compare reaction times for One 
and Many Stroop effects for Condition 1 and Condition 2; t(100)<0.90, p>.37 in all 
cases. This important result shows that the training regime did not have any influence 
on the induced Stroop effect for the meaningless labels. Also, we ran similar t-tests to 
examine whether the counterbalancing we carried out with respect to which words 
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were associated with which meaningless labels had any effect (recall that for each 
condition we used two experimental scripts, reflecting different associations between 
meaningless labels and real words). All t-tests were also not significant (t(100)<0.89, 
p>.37 in all cases). We next examined whether there was any evidence of a speed-
accuracy trade-off either in the learning results for Session 5 (the final session) or the 
Stroop tasks. We correlated RTs with error rates for the One and Many labels 
separately in Session 5 (respectively, r=0.20, p=.046 and r=0.31, p=.002) and for the 
Stroop results for the One label (r=-.03, p=.79) and the Many label (r=-.11, p=.29). 
There was no evidence for a speed accuracy trade-off (where correlations are 
significant, they are positive; a speed accuracy trade-off would be evidenced in 
negative correlations). The final preliminary check concerns Stroop interference for 
the real words associated with the One label (One word) versus Stroop interference 
for the real words associated with the Many label (Many words). Clearly, in this case 
we would expect no difference, since these were ordinary words chosen to be as 
neutral as possible. A paired-samples t-test confirmed this expectation (t(101)=0.38, 
p=.70).  
 Was there higher Stroop interference for the One label or the Many label? In 
standard emotional Stroop studies, a difference measure is computed for the RT of the 
words assumed to be more distracting versus the RT of the words assumed to be 
neutral. By analogy, we used a paired-samples t-test to compare the Stroop RT for the 
One and the Many label, which revealed the Stroop RT for the One label (M=754ms, 
SD=203ms) to be higher than the Stroop RT for the Many label (M=708ms, 
SD=151ms): t(101)=2.36, p=.020. Thus, it appears that the One label was more 
distracting than the Many label. Note that in Stroop experiments a control condition is 
typically compared to an experimental one. In our experiments, a control condition is 
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implied by the fact that the two labels employed were meaningless words. Therefore, 
given the observed results, the Many label condition is effectively the control 
condition for the One label condition, so that, strictly speaking, Stroop interference 
applies only to the One label condition.  
 The above t-test illustrates the main finding, which readily generalizes in a 
more complete statistical test. We created a mixed-design ANCOVA with Stroop RT 
for the One and Many labels as a within participants factor, Condition 1 versus 
Condition 2 as a between participants factor, and two covariates. One covariate relates 
to whether some of our participants may have found the associates with the One label 
more emotionally salient compared to the associates with the Many label (despite the 
counterbalancing we did with respect to which words were associated with the One 
and the Many label, it is still possible that some differences might arise due to random 
individual preference). We computed an index of emotional valence for each word, as 
the sum of the positive feelings for a word minus the sum of the negative feelings for 
the word. The covariate variable was the difference in the emotional valence values 
for the One word minus the average of the emotional valence values for the Many 
words. A second covariate concerns the difference in speed of responding for the One 
associations compared to the Many associations in the last training session (Session 
5). This covariate was computed as the difference in RT for trials with the One label 
minus trials with the Many label, in Session 5. The main effect for the difference 
between the color-naming latency of the One and Many labels was, as before, 
significant (F(1,98)=7.99, p=.006). The interaction with Condition was not significant 
(F(1,98)=0.41, p=.53). The covariates did not have any effect.  
 
General Discussion 
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Tiffany’s (1990) model of substance abuse (and psychopathology more generally) 
provides an elegant and simple account of interference in the emotional Stroop. 
When, for example, an alcohol abuser sees an alcohol-related word a number of 
concepts linked to alcohol (such as ‘relaxation’, ‘the armchair where I usually drink’, 
‘the fact that there is a bottle of gin in the cupboard’ etc.) are automatically activated, 
causing a temporary bottleneck in cognitive processing, which slows down reaction 
time. To examine this hypothesis under laboratory conditions, we trained participants 
to associate a meaningless label with one word and another meaningless label with 
many words. If this account of the Stroop were to be supported, we would have found 
a greater induced Stroop effect for the Many label compared to the One label. Our 
results were exactly the opposite, even taking into account potential differences in 
emotional valence of the words and learnability between the One and the Many 
associations.  
 The two conditions were meant to address different possible confounds in the 
training of the associations. In Condition 1 the One and the Many labels were 
presented to participants the same number of times, since it is possible that absolute 
frequency of (meaningless label) presentation is the most important possible 
consideration to control for (Table 1). However, a potential problem with this design 
is that in the learning task there were many more ‘goes with’ trials for the Many label 
compared to the One label; most of the learning trials for the One label were ‘does not 
go with’. It is possible that participants learned that the One label ‘goes with’ a certain 
word and also that the One label ‘does not go’ with certain other words (cf. Shanks & 
Darby, 1998), creating a potential imbalance in the complexity of the associations 
between the two labels. Accordingly, with Condition 2 we presented only one 
instance of each negative association for each of the meaningless labels (Table 2). In 
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this way, the One label could no longer be said to involve more negative associations 
than the Many label and the only factor affecting the induced Stroop interference 
effect would be the number of positive associations: one vs. many. Of course, a 
problem with the design of Condition 2, is that there were many more learning trials 
involving the Many label compared to the One label. In sum, Condition 1 and 
Condition 2 had different (design) strengths and weaknesses. Crucially, there was no 
main effect of condition in the dependent variables of interest. 
 The finding that the induced Stroop effect for the One label was higher than 
for the Many label is consistent with the Mackintosh (1975) and Kruschke et al. 
(2005) proposals for associative learning, according to which a cue more strongly 
associated with a target will attract more attention. Likewise, Tzelgov et al.’s (1997) 
research suggests that when an association between words and meaning is stronger, 
then a corresponding Stroop effect would also be stronger.  
An issue to consider here is whether we are justified in calling the observed 
results an induced ‘Stroop’ effect. In defining the emotional Stroop effect, Cox et al. 
(2006, p.444) pointed out that ‘It reflects how performance suffers from selective 
attention to aspects of a stimulus that should be ignored in a task’. Researchers in the 
area have come to accept as ‘Stroop effects’ an increase in latency in a color-naming 
task, more or less regardless of how this increase arises. For example, Warren (1972) 
reported that a word on a Stroop trial should lead to higher Stroop interference if is 
primed from a previous trial. Klein (1964) also reported than any common word leads 
to some Stroop interference (noting, of course, that words whose meaning is related to 
color cause more interference; see also,  Monsell, 2001). Likewise, in our 
experiments, we have a situation in which the color-naming latency for the One label 
increases relative to the color-naming latency for the Many label, presumably due to 
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the different number of associations with each label (noting also that, because of how 
the results turned out, the Many label condition is implied to correspond to the Stroop 
control condition).  
Overall, the induced Stroop paradigm provides some interesting possibilities 
for examining related theories of cognition (such as theories of associative learning) 
and with future work we hope to address such possibilities more carefully. Finally, 
note that other researchers have created artificial Stroop effects. For example, 
Schmidt and Besner (2008) have also explored an artificial Stroop effect, but in the 
context of the strength of associations between a word and a color; i.e., in the case of 
these investigators Stroop interference was the result of conflict. As far as we are 
aware, this is the first report of an induced Stroop effect analogous to the emotional 
Stroop effect.  
 The implications for Tiffany’s theory are that, at best, this theory is 
incomplete, if we want to use the theory as an account of emotional Stroop (noting 
that Tiffany proposed his theory to explain substance abuse, rather than the emotional 
Stroop task). One challenge in Tiffany’s theory is to explain how particular 
associations in a person’s daily routine (such as ones involving alcohol and positive 
alcohol expectancies) become automatic and persistent to the point of disrupting a 
person’s life, but other associations (e.g., feelings of pleasure with drinking water and 
water) less so. It is possible that associations about which we introspect become 
automatic more rapidly. As Hogarth and colleagues noted, unless a person is 
explicitly aware of an association, it is unlikely that such an association will affect 
attention (e.g., Hogarth et al., 2008a). Another possibility, motivated from Robinson 
and Berridge’s (1993) theory, is that associations for which the cue and/or the target 
are more emotionally salient become automatic more rapidly (cf. Robinson & 
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Berridge, 1993). Finally, although there has been extensive consideration of the role 
of attention in associative learning, theories for the transition between a learned 
association and an automatic association have been less well developed. 
Understanding the development of automatic behavior in terms of theories of 
associative learning appears a promising direction for future research.  
In closing, it appears that research on the induced Stroop effect has the 
potential of not only informing the current understanding of the emotional Stroop 
effect, but also potentially challenging current theories of automaticity and the 
circumstances that lead to automatic associations (cf. Logan, 1980, 1998; Kruschke et 
al., 2005; Tzelgov, 1997).  
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Tables.  
Table 1. The structure of Condition 1.  
_________________________________________________________________ 
Relative frequencies:  
One Label 
 1 trial goes with    x 1 
 7 trials does not go with
1
   x 1 
Many Label 
 7 trials goes with    x 1 










 = 6 




 = 42 
Many Label 




 = 42 




 = 6 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes. 
1‘does not go with’ refers to trials in which the correct answer was that the 
label and the real word do not go together. 
2
Absolute frequencies refer to the total 
number of trials participants went through on each training day. 
3
 ‘left. right’ and the 
x2multiplier refer to the fact that each association was presented twice, one in which 
the meaningless label was shown on the left of the screen and another in which it was 
shown on the right. 
4
Each learning session in this condition had three blocks of 32 
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Table 2. The structure of Condition 2.  
_________________________________________________________________ 
Relative frequencies:  
One Label 
 1 trial goes with    x 5 
 7 trials does not go with
1
   x 1 
Many Label 
 7 trials goes with    x 5 






 trial goes with    1 x 2
3
 x 5 = 10 
 trials does not go with   7 x 2
3
 x 1 = 14 
Many Label 
 trials goes with   7 x 2
3
 x 5 = 70 
 trial does not go with    1 x 2
3
 x 1 = 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Notes. 
1‘does not go with’ refers to trials in which the correct answer was that the 
label and the real word do not go together. 
2
Absolute frequencies refer to the total 
number of trials participants went through on each training day, which was 96 trials. 
3
the x2multiplier refer to the fact that each association was presented twice, one in 
which the meaningless label was shown on the left of the screen and another in which 
it was shown on the right. 
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Figure 
Figure 1. Acquisition curves for the associations with the One and Many labels for the 
two conditions. Error bars denote 1 SD; for clarity, we show only positive error bars 
for the One label curves and only negative error bars for the Many label curves.  
 
 
 
 
